

**CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday 27 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J. de CASTRO (Brazil)

63-15797

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. F. DOBLAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEM

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States): I should like to speak this morning on the question of a nuclear weapons test ban treaty, but my statement grows to some degree out of certain remarks made on another subject by the Soviet representative on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, pp.5 et seq.). The Soviet representative spoke on that occasion about the Soviet proposal on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles advanced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1962 (A/PV.1127, p.38-40 prov.). He specifically referred to my delegation's questions about the number of missiles which the Soviet Union proposed to retain under its suggestions until the end of stage II of general and complete disarmament. While he did not provide us with specific numbers of such missiles, he did state clearly that the West should agree on certain principles or criteria, and that he thought the fixing of a number would then be considerably simplified.

Mr. Tsarapkin went on to draw the following analogy between the fixing of the number of missiles which might be retained under the Soviet proposal for delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the fixing of the number of on-site inspections under a nuclear test ban treaty. He said:

"Take, for example, the lamentable experience of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, where only a few units, for instance, in the question of the number of control posts or inspections, were a sufficient pretext for the Western Powers to block agreement. It would be another matter if we were to agree beforehand on the basic principle, on the criteria to be used as a guide in determining the number of missiles to be retained. In these circumstances there should be no great difference between the specific proposals of either side on the number of missiles to be retained, since both sides would be guided by the same criteria in determining these numbers and would base themselves on the same basic principle.

"As a result, the figures proposed by both sides should be fairly close to each other and may even coincide. In any case, in these circumstances the process of agreeing the number of missiles to be retained would be incomparably easier. As you see, this analysis shows that the approach proposed by the Soviet Union to the solution of this question is logical and realistic and can easily be carried out in practice. We call upon our Western partners to come to an agreement without delay on the matter of principle and then proceed to

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

a discussion of the specific numbers of missiles of various types and categories to be retained on the basis of the agreed principle, the agreed criterion. Such an agreement would entail substantial progress in our negotiations. We call upon the Western Powers to respond to this initiative of the Soviet Union and to make their contribution to the cause of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.132, pp.18, 19)

I apologize to the Committee and to our Soviet colleague for reading such a long quotation, but I believe that in this case the full context of the Soviet representative's remarks should not be overlooked. It seems to us that in that statement the Soviet delegation might have been advancing a helpful suggestion. Indeed, the procedure suggested is exactly the one we have been asking the Soviet delegation to follow on the question of reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. It is clear that we shall have to look at the principles and criteria, as the Soviet representative calls them, in conjunction with arriving at agreement on the number of inspections under a nuclear test ban treaty.

We must say, of course, that the differences between the two situations -- a test ban treaty and the reduction of delivery vehicles -- are striking. Under the Gromyko proposal the Soviet delegation has failed to suggest a number, in contradistinction to its position on test ban inspections. In addition, on the question of delivery vehicles the Soviet delegation appears to be pressing for the adoption of principles or criteria which do not seem to us to take into account the already agreed joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5) and which are instead principles which themselves serve as road-blocks rather than bridges on the path to agreement.

There are, nevertheless, two points which seem to us to be important in connexion with a test ban and which are clear from what the Soviet representative said in the quotation I have read. First, he has proposed a method of work, an approach to our task, which has some merit. Secondly, he has related that approach which he recommends to the task of reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. More specifically, he has, I submit, indicated his support for such an approach as leading towards agreement on the numbers of inspections which might be carried out under a nuclear test ban treaty. It is for this reason that my delegation believes it to be worth while to discuss in somewhat more detail the passage I have just read from the Soviet representative's statement made on 15 May.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In that passage the Soviet representative stated that a useful method of procedure would be to agree on questions of criteria and principles first, before agreeing on numbers. In this case, as the Committee well knows, the United Kingdom and the United States have advocated a similar method of work. Numerous times at this session of the Conference we have stated our belief that it would be useful to obtain agreement on the criteria or principles governing on-site inspections in order then to make a logical and reasonable approach to the problem of agreeing on the number of such inspections. We are gratified that the Soviet Union now appears to show some signs of adopting a similar approach.

On the question of the principle of on-site inspection, on 19 December 1962 in a letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to the President of the United States, the Soviet Union proposed that:

"... we would be prepared to agree to 2-3 inspections a year being carried out in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers ..." (ENDC/73, p.5)

That appeared to us to be clearly a Soviet return to the principle of on-site inspection. Our assumption was reinforced by the words of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the remaining portion of the sentence from which I have just quoted, where Chairman Khrushchev said in this connexion that the inspections would be carried out:

"... when it was considered necessary, in seismic regions where any suspicious earth tremors occurred" (ibid.)

In later correspondence Chairman Khrushchev modified the phrase "seismic regions", but it was clear that he was talking in that case also about the necessity for inspecting "suspicious earth tremors".

It is precisely this case of the occurrence of suspicious earth tremors which has impelled the United States and the United Kingdom to insist on a reasonable number of on-site inspections. It is the occurrence of these suspicious or unidentified events that requires the United States and the United Kingdom to seek adequate means for their identification so as to ensure that a nuclear test ban treaty is being observed.

On the question of criteria and arrangements for on-site inspections, once agreement on the principle of inspection really exists, it should prove to be no problem, we believe, to work out objective arrangements about when, as Chairman Khrushchev phrased it, "it was considered necessary" to conduct an on-site inspection.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The United Kingdom and the United States have already made a number of concrete proposals on these subjects. The proposals for the arrangements we suggest for on-site inspection are clearly set forth in the memorandum tabled by our two delegations on 1 April 1963 (ENDC/78).

The Soviet statement made on 15 May on a possible method of work on the question of on-site inspection could be, we believe, a hopeful sign. Indeed, it may well constitute an as yet unrecognized response to the searching questions posed by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 18 February (ENDC/PV.99, pp.13 et seq.). In that case it appears to my delegation to accept the spirit of the proposals made at that meeting by the representative of the United Arab Republic. Indeed, those are proposals, like a number of others made by the eight non-aligned delegations to our Conference, which my delegation and the United Kingdom delegation have supported.

We hope we may hear more clearly from the Soviet representative that his statement made on 15 May was designed to breach the wall which his delegation has created against almost all the recent suggestions in this Conference by the eight non-aligned delegations. For the procedure which the Soviet representative seemed to suggest on 15 May would, we sincerely believe, be a useful approach towards reaching agreement on the outstanding questions of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

First of all, I should like to reply to what has just been said by the United States representative on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It seems to us that he has formulated a completely wrong assessment of the real situation in regard to this question and, in trying to justify it, he referred to part of the statement I made on 15 May. First I must point out that in the course of the statement I made on 15 May, in insisting that between the Soviet Union and the United States there should first be an agreement in principle in regard to the fundamental criteria to be used as a guide in the question of the retention of a strictly limited number of missiles, I pointed out that this approach was all the more appropriate and necessary because, as experience in our past negotiations has shown, even a difference of a few inspections had the result that no agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests was achieved. The example I put forward related to the past and it was only the stubbornness of the United States in adhering to its old positions that enabled Mr. Stelle to refer to that statement of mine.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In order to make the matter clear and to show the state of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in its true light, I think it appropriate to repeat what I did on 13 May, when I read out the following passage from one of my earlier statements: (ENDC/PV.126, p.26)

"However, having admitted the effectiveness of national means of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States lapsed into an obvious inconsistency in its position, an inconsistency which has in fact led our negotiations on this question once again into an impasse. The point is that, having recognized the effectiveness of national systems of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned completely all claims in respect of on-site inspection. At the present time the demand for on-site inspection is untenable and unnecessary from the standpoint of control. This was in fact admitted by the United States scientists, who in the aforementioned letter of 9 April stated that they regarded on-site inspection only as an additional guarantee. But the official position of the United States in the negotiations here in Geneva has not undergone any essential or radical changes in regard to inspection. The present position of the United States is inconsistent and does not stand up to criticism.

"Well then, the situation at present is clear enough. The negotiations have again reached an impasse because of the position of the United States. The responsibility for this lies entirely with the United States." (ENDC/PV.131, p.13)

I have nothing more to add on the question raised today by the United States representative.

The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to inform the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of a note<sup>\*/</sup> addressed by the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States in connexion with the deployment of United States nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear missiles in the area of the Mediterranean Sea. This note was sent to the Government of the United States on 20 May. The text is as follows:

"The Government of the Soviet Union deems it necessary to state to the Government of the United States the following:

"Quite recently the Soviet Government was compelled to utter a warning against the plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force which would give the West German Bundeswehr access to atomic weapons and unleash a nuclear armaments race knowing neither State nor geographical bounds. Today the peoples are witnessing the fact that the Governments of the United States and certain other NATO members are taking further steps in the same direction.

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\*/ Circulated as document ENDC/91.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"The point in question is the already started implementation of plans for the deployment of United States nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear missiles in the Mediterranean area. As possible bases for these submarines, ports in Spain and British military bases in Cyprus and Malta have been mentioned. There are reports that submarines equipped with Polaris missiles will also use ports in Turkey, Greece and Italy. Two such nuclear submarines have already entered the Mediterranean and are settling down in the coastal waters of Greece and Turkey.

"Thus the United States and some of its allies are demonstrating once again that concern for the prevention of a thermonuclear war or at least for the reduction of the danger of its outbreak is alien to their policy. Instead of joining in the efforts of those States which, in anticipation of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament, are already striving to narrow the field of preparations for a nuclear war, the Powers in the lead in NATO are bringing within the orbit of these preparations yet another extensive area with a population of approximately 300 millions.

"What will be the result of turning the Mediterranean Sea into a gigantic reservoir filled with scores of missiles having megatons of nuclear load? What does it mean to turn the Mediterranean basin into a kind of missiledrome where every mile of the sea's surface can be used by an aggressor as a launching site for nuclear weapons?

"In the first place, it increases immeasurably the danger that the Mediterranean and the adjacent countries may become the theatre of devastating military operations. Even States which neither have nor wish to have anything to do with the aggressive preparations of NATO - and these are the overwhelming majority in the Mediterranean - in fact find themselves in a situation where the right to control their future is appropriated by those who command the nuclear submarines cruising in the vicinity of their coasts. Under their security and sovereignty are being spread the trammels of the same dangerous policy in which the countries which have made their territories available for the location of NATO military bases have been caught.

"The alarm of the Arabs, Yugoslavs, Albanians and Cypriots, and of other peoples as well, cannot be allayed by assertions that the sending of United States missile-carrying submarines into the Mediterranean is no more than a "technical" operation to replace the land-based Jupiter missiles on the territory of Turkey and Italy with other, more improved ones. No, the replacement of United States fixed missile bases by floating ones which is now being carried out entails far-reaching political and military consequences: the spectre of nuclear war which at first set foot on the land of those countries which are themselves actively participating in the military arrangements of NATO has now been given an entry visa on all the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Submarines equipped with Polaris missiles cruising along the shores of the Mediterranean countries would extend the area from which a nuclear attack could be launched and, consequently, would also enlarge the geographical sphere of application of the inevitable counter-measures for the purpose of neutralizing the bases of aggression.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"It is obvious that the countries in which these submarines are based permanently or from time to time, would expose themselves to the greatest danger. But there is no guarantee, nor can there be any, that a nuclear submarine will not release its death-dealing load from international waters and then try to hide off the coast of a State not forming part of the North Atlantic bloc, or that it will not fire a salvo directly from the territorial waters of that State. The likelihood of such a course of events cannot be excluded, especially as many States of the Mediterranean basin are without practical means to prevent nuclear submarines from entering their waters and only a few minutes would be required for the irreparable to be accomplished.

"The introduction into the Mediterranean Sea of NATO military vessels with nuclear weapons on board makes it necessary for the States whose security is being threatened by the North Atlantic bloc to carry out effective defensive counter-measures in order to be in a position to repulse any encroachment upon the peaceful life of their peoples and not to leave the NATO Powers a free hand to use the Mediterranean as a spring-board for possible aggression. The peace-loving States will have no other choice than to keep their means of neutralization trained on the routes along which the nuclear submarines move, as well as on the coasts of NATO members and those countries which make their territories available to this bloc as permanent or periodic bases for nuclear missile weapons.

"It should be clear to everyone that the NATO military staffs are leading matters to the point where the Mediterranean, instead of being the shortest commercial sea route linking West and East and a traditional place of rest and international tourism, would become the lair of the carriers of nuclear death and yet another area of dangerous rivalry and conflict.

"What have the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, North Africa, the Near and Middle East, all countries situated along the perimeter of the Mediterranean or even in the depths of the continents, to gain, if missile-bearing nuclear submarines rove along their coasts? Will this increase their security or help to improve their lives? Is it possible to think that the Greeks, Turks, Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards and other peoples of the Mediterranean will feel safer if foreign missiles and atom bombs over which they have no power or control are put in firing position on their very thresholds? Even in the event of an accidental combination of circumstances, against their will and desire the peoples of this area may become the victims of a deadly catastrophe.

"The peoples of the Mediterranean have had to suffer many things in the course of their history. From the innumerable conflicts which shook ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome and Carthage to the two World Wars in this century, this area has experienced all the vicissitudes of armed rivalry between States. But even in the Second World War, which rapidly spread to the African continent and across the Near and Far East, there was no weapon even remotely comparable in destructive power with the one now hiding in the waves of the Mediterranean Sea or with the one which would be used to deliver a counter-blow to an aggressor if this sea were used as a centre and hiding place for an aggressor. If the worst came to

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the worst in these days, the Mediterranean Sea would become a dead sea in every sense of the word. Many centres of civilization and culture would be threatened with a fate similar to that of Pompeii. Even people who have no religious views can understand the feelings of millions of Christians and Moslems in connexion with the fact that in the implementation of the plans of the NATO leaders nuclear weapons would be almost under the walls of the Vatican, Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina.

"The Governments of the Western Powers try to justify their plans to station Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean Sea on the grounds that it is an open sea and that whether or not to make ports available for missile-carrying vessels is a domestic affair of the individual States. But by what right are four or five States, which have linked themselves with the policy of NATO, without considering the interests of the other Mediterranean countries, prepared to throw open the gates of Gibraltar to a stream of nuclear weapons? If, for example, the Governments of Turkey, Greece, Italy or Spain allow submarines or surface vessels with nuclear weapons on board to shelter in their waters, they will not only be trifling with the fate of their own countries but will also endanger the security of neighbouring countries.

"The Governments of the United States and the other NATO countries have not been lacking in assurances that the United States Polaris submarines are being sent to the Mediterranean Sea for 'defensive purposes' and even for the 'protection' of the countries of this area. It would be no exaggeration, however, to say that of all the existing means of waging war the United States weapon now being stationed in the Mediterranean Sea is the least fitted to serve defensive purposes but, on the other hand, it is the most suitable for any kind of provocation. The distinctive feature of the use of nuclear submarines as mobile missile bases is that they are designed to conceal preparations for, and to ensure the sudden delivery of, a nuclear attack.

"Furthermore, in the Soviet Union, and no doubt in other countries as well, one remembers the recent statements of highly placed persons in the United States to the effect that under certain circumstances the United States might take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the USSR. The Soviet Government could not fail to pay attention also to the statements of leading military personalities in the United States to the effect that the United States submarines which have been sent to the Mediterranean Sea have been previously assigned certain targets in the Soviet Union.

"It will not be superfluous to note further that it has also often been said that the purpose of the United States Sixth Fleet, which has been roaming about the Mediterranean Sea from year to year, is to help the Mediterranean countries to protect their independence and security. But in the log-book of the Commander of this Fleet there is not a single entry of any operation in support of the sovereign rights of independence of the countries of North Africa or the Near East.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"On the contrary, the ships of the Sixth Fleet participated in preparing for an attack on Syria in 1957, which was frustrated as a result of the decisive action, in the first place, of the Soviet Union. With the forces of this Fleet the United States occupied the coast of Lebanon in the summer of 1958. United States Navy ships covered foreign intervention in Jordan. It was within sight of the Sixth Fleet that the United States NATO allies, the United Kingdom and France, together with Israel, carried out an aggression against Egypt and bombed Cairo and Port Said.

"Those are the facts. They depict quite definitely the true state of affairs.

"What are United States Navy ships seeking in the Mediterranean Sea, thousands of miles away from the national boundaries of the United States? What are the real aims that are being pursued when, in addition to surface vessels, nuclear submarines with nuclear weapons are now being sent there? The NATO measures for spreading nuclear weapons to new areas speak for themselves. And further light on the intentions of the United States is shed by the statements of United States military leaders who recently justified the need to station United States nuclear weapons in Canada by saying that in the event of war this would make it possible to draw part of a nuclear counter-blow away from the United States and divert it to Canada. This was said, it is true, in respect of Canada and not the Mediterranean Sea. But what is concerned in both cases is preparation for a nuclear war, which is being carried out within the framework of one and the same policy, and one and the same strategy.

"Some people may consider it almost the summit of military thinking to hide their nuclear missile bases as far away as possible from their own vital centres and closer to the borders of other countries. But can the millions of people living in the Mediterranean area be content with the position of hostages in which the leading Powers of NATO are trying to place them? Everything shows that the military plans of these Powers - today more than ever - include the intention, in the event of a conflict, to divert to States wholly innocent in such a conflict, part of the nuclear counter-blow which would be duly delivered to the aggressor.

"There is yet another circumstance which cannot be disregarded. As is well known, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring Africa a denuclearized zone. This resolution was aimed at saving the African continent from the dangers connected with a further spread of nuclear weapons. Not a single NATO State dared vote against it. But by setting out to turn the waters washing the shores of North Africa into a nuclear missile base, the United States and its allies are flagrantly flouting this resolution of the United Nations.

"Obviously, it is no mere coincidence that the plans for sending United States submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean Sea appeared simultaneously with plans for the creation of a so-called 'multi-national' and 'multilateral' NATO nuclear force, in which a significant role is assigned to the West German revanchists and militarists. These are elements of one and the same policy - the policy of an unbridled armaments race and the spreading of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"The Soviet people is engaged in peaceful labour and wishes only peace and prosperity to other peoples. The Soviet Government firmly believes in the principles of peaceful co-existence - it is prepared to settle on the basis of these principles all questions of its relations with any other countries, regardless of social differences, without any interference in the internal affairs of other States.

"Faithful to the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving its support to proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world; for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, and the immediate reduction of armaments and armed forces in the areas where the possibility of a conflict is particularly great. The Soviet Government advocates renunciation of the use of foreign territories and ports for the stationing of any type of strategic weapon, including submarines with nuclear missile weapons.

"The Soviet Union has submitted specific proposals on all these questions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. The implementation of these proposals would strengthen mutual confidence between States and facilitate the solution of the main problem of our time - general and complete disarmament.

"But what the United States and its allies are now doing in creating a concentrated NATO nuclear force and taking the course of spreading nuclear missile weapons to other continents and seas is placing additional obstacles in the path to disarmament.

"In the interests of ensuring international security, the Soviet Government proposes that the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea should be declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons. It is prepared to assume an obligation not to deploy any nuclear weapons or their means of delivery in the waters of this area provided that similar obligations are assumed by the other Powers. If this area is declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons, then, jointly with the United States and the other countries of the West, the Soviet Union is prepared to give reliable guarantees that in the event of any military complications the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered as outside the sphere of use of nuclear weapons.

"Implementation of these proposals would contribute to mutual understanding and friendship in the relations between the countries of the Mediterranean area; it would enable the States of the Mediterranean basin to devote more of their forces and resources to the solution of their economic and social problems. It would at the same time be a substantial contribution towards lessening the general international tension and towards ensuring peace in Europe, Africa and throughout the world.

"The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will consider with due attention the considerations set forth in this note."

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Those were the contents of the note sent by the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States. Notes with similar contents were also sent to the Governments of Algeria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

In that note it is pointed out that what the United States and its allies are now doing in creating a concentrated NATO nuclear force and taking the course of spreading nuclear missile weapons to other continents and seas is placing additional obstacles in the path to disarmament.

The recently ended NATO Council session in Ottawa adopted decisions leading to a further intensification of the arms race and, above all, in the form most dangerous to mankind, namely, in the field of nuclear armaments.

In the communiqué adopted on 24 May by the NATO Council session in Ottawa, there are a number of points which directly indicate this. For example, paragraph 7 of the communiqué mentions the growing scope and complexity of the problems facing NATO, while paragraph 8 is devoted entirely to measures for the organization, development and co-ordination of the NATO nuclear force. Paragraph 9 states that the countries belonging to the NATO bloc have recognized the need to intensify the race also in the field of conventional armaments, which is allegedly not keeping pace with the nuclear armaments race, as a result of which conventional armaments are lagging behind nuclear armaments. This decision is embodied in the following sentence:

"Ministers recognized the need to achieve a satisfactory balance between nuclear and conventional armaments".

So in Ottawa a new impetus, a new stimulus has been given to the armaments race.

There is no doubt that the Ottawa decisions of the NATO Council place additional, serious obstacles in the path to disarmament. The NATO decisions in Ottawa are aimed at further intensifying the armaments race both in the field of nuclear armaments and in the field of conventional armaments, side by side with the measures now being carried out to introduce NATO naval vessels with nuclear weapons on board into the Mediterranean Sea, thus expending the geographical sphere of the use of nuclear missiles and exposing the peoples of the Mediterranean area to mortal danger, and side by side with the continuation of nuclear weapon tests by the United States and France - all this now characterizes the true orientation of the policy of the Western Powers. Everybody in

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the world understands that the Western Powers are at present not interested in disarmament. The Western Powers' continuing policy "from a position of strength" leads them to intensify the armaments race, the purpose of which is to ensure material support for this policy.

The introduction into the Mediterranean Sea of NATO naval vessels with nuclear weapons on board and the decisions adopted at the recent NATO Council session in Ottawa show that the leading Powers in NATO are making the countries of Europe and the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea more and more the object of their policy of atomic blackmail by involving them in their insane plans for the preparation of a nuclear missile war in Europe and in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea. In pursuing such a policy in Europe, the leading NATO Powers know what it will lead to. They know what it may end in. Nevertheless they are cynically sacrificing the security of the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe, to their aggressive policy, without hesitating to stake the very existence of some of the most densely populated European countries. Of course, the authors of this policy, who are on the other side of the Atlantic, many thousands of miles away from Europe and the Mediterranean countries, are profoundly indifferent to the fate of the many dozens of millions of people of Europe and the Mediterranean area; they are prepared to sacrifice them without hesitation to their policy "from a position of strength". All the more loudly should the peoples of Europe and the peoples throughout the world sound the alarm against this policy of the Western Powers, because if war should break out in Europe it would inevitably spread to other continents within a matter of hours or even minutes.

The peoples of the world are becoming increasingly aware of the need to do so and are taking measures to save themselves from the nuclear "solicitudes" of the NATO Powers.

In this connexion, we should like to recall the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on declaring Africa a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652 (XVI)) the steps taken in this direction by the countries of Latin America, (ENDC/87) the proposal of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1) for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, the views expressed in this regard by the former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Unden, (A/C.1/SR.1196) and so on.

Important steps have already been taken in this direction, but it is only a beginning. The fact that there is an authoritative international resolution on declaring

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Africa a denuclearized zone; the fact that a start has been given to measures aimed at turning the whole of Latin America into a denuclearized zone, and the fact that certain Scandinavian members of NATO - Norway, Denmark and Iceland - have reserved their position with regard to their participation in a NATO nuclear force - all these are very encouraging facts which show that the determination of the peoples can overcome the pressure of the militarists and force them to retreat.

Mr. CHEISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): At the meeting of our Committee on 24 May, the Bulgarian delegation had occasion to refer to two items on the agenda of the Conference, namely, the question of possible measures to put an end to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and, more especially, the question of creating denuclearized zones as one of the most effective means of preventing such dissemination. (ENDC/PV.136, pp. 35 - 36).

We showed that the idea of creating denuclearized zones has won a favourable welcome and increasing support, that the governments of many countries attach paramount importance to the problem of ending the dissemination of nuclear weapons, that the anxiety on the subject shown by all peoples and governments deeply concerned with the fate of international peace and security shows the keen awareness of the dangerous consequences that the dissemination of nuclear weapons throughout the world might have.

We also had occasion to stress the importance that the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches to this problem and our unchanging attitude towards the establishment of denuclearized zones in different regions of the world, particularly in regions that are sensitive as regards the maintenance of peace and the lessening of the dangers of nuclear war.

In that connexion, my delegation has stressed in particular the gravity of the consequences of the United States attempt to include the Mediterranean region in its plans for the formation of NATO's so-called "nuclear multilateral or multinational forces". The reaction of the Western delegations to the statements of the socialist countries is monotonous, being confined to repeating that these statements are propaganda "diverting us from our task" and having nothing to do with the questions on our Committee's agenda.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

However - and we deeply regret this conclusion - the apprehensions of the socialist countries are fully justified; for the plans to transform the Mediterranean into a depot for nuclear weapons and missiles are now going ahead rapidly. Polaris-equipped submarines are already cruising in the Mediterranean and giving unpeaceful performances in Greek and Turkish territorial waters and harbours.

We are thus entitled to say once again that the introduction into the Mediterranean of United States nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles under long-term plans for the formation of NATO multilateral nuclear forces is a fact fraught with consequences. The very fact of creating mobile forces increases the radius of the nuclearized zone; it not only carries with it the charge of aggression, but it provokes retaliation. The mobile base becomes a multiple base - not, of course, through its aggression potential, which is itself a constant, but through the riposte it provokes and through the fact that it draws many countries into the nuclear maelstrom. The mobile base, the multiple base, merely multiplies the danger, which becomes proportional to the mobility of the strategic nuclear base. The introduction of Polaris-equipped submarines into the Mediterranean has further aggravated threats to the peace and security of the countries in that region. The sea that was so well named in the past "the centre of the earth" is being transformed into a gigantic reservoir of thermonuclear missiles.

In face of this new and very grave threat to the peace and security of the countries situated in that part of the world, the Soviet Government's note of 20 May and the proposal it contains that the Mediterranean be declared a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles take on exceptional importance. (ENDC/91)

The Soviet note very appropriately puts the question which is today worrying the peoples of the Mediterranean countries: What is the meaning of these preparations? What is the meaning of transforming the Mediterranean basin into a kind of gigantic base where each mile of water can be used for the launching of nuclear missiles?

The reply contained in the note is just as apt. The meaning is primarily an immeasurable aggravation of the danger that the Mediterranean and the countries around it may become the theatre of devastating military operations. Even countries that have and wish to have nothing to do with NATO's aggressive preparations will find themselves in a situation where the commanders of the nuclear submarines will presume to decide their future.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

This, then, is the situation that has now arisen in the Mediterranean. But, as is well known, it will get still worse with the number of Polaris-equipped submarines and with the inevitable consequences of NATO's military and strategic preparations now either being put into effect or under study at NATO headquarters.

The Soviet note also draws attention to an extremely serious fact, namely, the dissemination of nuclear weapons - in which connexion I may perhaps quote the following passage:

"Obviously, it is no mere coincidence that the plans for sending United States submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean Sea appeared simultaneously with plans for the creation of a so-called 'multinational' and 'multilateral' NATO nuclear force, in which a significant role is assigned to the West German revisionists and militarists. These are elements of one and the same policy - the policy of an unbridled armaments race and the spreading of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/91, p.8)

We have had occasion to express the views of the Bulgarian delegation on the subject. I should like now to add a few comments on the same question. We have more than once heard it stated that the formation of NATO nuclear forces in no way implies proliferation of nuclear weapons, and even that the aim and object of forming these multinational and multilateral forces would be to prevent such proliferation.

Let us look more closely at the facts. At the very recent meeting of the NATO Council in Ottawa concrete decisions were taken, as everyone knows, concerning the formation of additional nuclear forces. In that connexion, according to the final communiqué, it was decided that the Supreme Command in Europe will be given British bombers and the American submarines in the Mediterranean, that a deputy will be appointed in charge of nuclear questions and that arrangements will be made to ensure wider participation in nuclear activities by officers from NATO countries.

It was explained that this force is not yet the multinational and multilateral force; but according to a statement by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, the Ottawa decisions represent a very important step, its importance lying, according to Mr. Rusk (I quote from an Agence France Presse dispatch published in Le Monde of 26-27 May), in the fact that

"... these are additional forces of considerable strength assigned to the Supreme Commander in Europe, to be commanded by the Supreme Commander and an allied military staff. The mere participation of allied officers in the handling of these weapons and in the choice of their objectives is in itself a cardinal sharing of nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance."

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

Is that clear enough? This force, including the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean - this pretty powerful force - will be under the orders of the Supreme Commander and an allied staff composed of officers from NATO countries among whom officers of the Bundeswehr will certainly not be occupying the most junior posts. These officers will participate in the handling of nuclear weapons and in the choice of their objectives.

This, we think, is quite clear. But may I, to avoid any misunderstanding, add a few words from a Press conference given after the Ottawa meeting by Mr. Stikker, the Secretary-General of NATO. Among other interesting things, Mr. Stikker said (and I am again quoting from an Agence France Presse dispatch, of 25 May):

"The measures decided upon by the NATO Council at Ottawa do not involve the creation of a new command. There is no change in the operational structure of SACEUR. Nevertheless, the deputy for nuclear questions who will be assigned to the NATO Supreme Command in Europe will bear heavy responsibilities, because his views and advice will carry great weight."

There, then is the task of the Deputy Supreme Commander and of the nuclear staff. They will play their part in handling nuclear weapons; they will choose their objectives, and will bear heavy responsibilities, because their views and advice will carry great weight.

After all this, will anyone dare to claim that this sort of action is not purely and simply a propagation, proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons? Polaris missiles are brought into the Mediterranean. A vast region of the globe is transformed into a missile base. So there is dissemination in space. Then these missiles, combined with other delivery vehicles, are assigned to a unified command. A special staff is formed of officers from many NATO countries, including Bundeswehr officers, whose task is explained to us by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Stikker. So there is a transfer of nuclear weapons. And afterwards we are told that this has nothing to do with the dissemination of nuclear weapons, that it is merely a technical operation. But what is dissemination of nuclear weapons?

We think the answer to that question is to be found in a statement by Mr. Lange, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to a Reuter dispatch of 25 May from Oslo, Mr. Lange, addressing the annual Congress of the Norwegian Socialist Party, said that a NATO maritime nuclear force is not a military necessity and that Norway will take no part in any move that would result in extending nuclear weapons to other nations.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

I shall not venture to interpret Mr. Lange's words; they seem clear enough to me, in the sense that Mr. Lange regards the multinational force as a move that will result in extending nuclear weapons to other nations. I shall merely point out that the headline in the newspaper in which I found this passage from Mr. Lange's speech was: "Norway will not Participate in Disseminating Nuclear Weapons". The newspaper was Le Monde of 26-27 May, for the editors of which, as for us and for millions of human beings, this means that plans and projects for forming multinational or other forces are no more and no less than projects for disseminating nuclear weapons.

One further proof. In a dispatch of 23 May from New York, ANSA reported that 55 scientists from eleven countries, including five Nobel Prize winners, had appealed to the governments of the NATO countries to renounce any measure which would extend to other countries the possession and control of nuclear weapons. The signatories emphasized the grave dangers in the possibility of more countries having their fingers on the "thermonuclear trigger", and called for the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

Thus, as has been pointed out by several delegations here, as the Bulgarian delegation has said, and as is well understood by men of goodwill in every country in the world, the introduction of Polaris-equipped submarines into the Mediterranean and the projected formation of NATO nuclear forces are flagrant acts of dissemination of nuclear weapons and a speeding-up of the arms race. They are acts that will have, may already have had, very serious repercussions on the international situation and will pile up further obstacles on the already cluttered path to disarmament.

The Soviet Union's proposal to make the Mediterranean region into a denuclearized zone is undoubtedly the only sure way to remove the new and serious threat to world security that has arisen out of the acts of the United States in the Mediterranean. Its implementation would be a very considerable contribution to the relaxation of international tension.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria warmly supports this new initiative of the Soviet Union, which is a further proof of its peaceful policy and its constant desire to contribute to finding the most effective ways and means of reducing international tension, consolidating peace and facilitating the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): At our meeting on Wednesday last 22 May the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, made a striking speech on the subject of nuclear weapon tests. In the course of that speech she said:

"The repetition of arguments and of more or less propaganda-loaded statements becomes counter-productive." (ENDC/PV.135, p. 33)

She went on to remind us of the harm that these could cause. It is not the intention of the United Kingdom delegation, and it never has been, to indulge in propaganda-loaded arguments. Particularly on the question of nuclear tests, we believe that, with good will on both sides, it is possible to reach a solution to the problem now. It is our earnest desire to achieve that, and we are willing now, as always, to enter into serious, detailed discussion with our Soviet colleagues on how to settle the remaining differences between us. All we ask is that they should not seek to confront us with a position they have established and then merely abuse us because we do not agree with the position they adopt.

We believe in genuine negotiation. That has been our position all along. It is our position today. However, if we are to consider the facts in this Conference, I suppose I have never heard a more propaganda-loaded statement than that which our Soviet colleague delivered to us today (supra, pp.9 *et seq.*). It is not my wish to indulge in repetitious arguments with our Soviet colleague, but the document<sup>1/</sup> which he read out to us, which had been sent as a diplomatic note not only to the United States but to other members of NATO, including my own Government, appeared to me to be pure propaganda from beginning to end. The extravagant charges and extravagant claims in it are all too familiar to those of us who sit in this Conference, and I can only regret that we should be once again led aside in this way in such a pointless manoeuvre. I think "manoeuvre" is a fair word to use in this context; for in fact, when one takes away the verbiage, what is left? What is left is a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean. That is the proposal.

The attitude of my delegation to the question of nuclear-free zones throughout the world has been spelled out on various occasions. I spelled it out myself as recently as on 6 May. (ENDC/PV.128, pp.24 *et seq.*) I made it clear then that we are prepared to regard with sympathy any proposal for a nuclear-free zone which has the support of the States directly concerned and is not in an area of direct military confrontation of the Great Powers or where there is not a complex system of essential defensive arrangements such as exists in Europe.

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<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/91.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I made plain the reasons why I did not think it practicable in relation to Europe. Of course, it is also important that, as provided in the fifth agreed principle (ENDC/5), the existing balance of power should not be upset. I leave it to the Committee to judge whether the Soviet proposal for the denuclearization of the Mediterranean fulfills any of those conditions, but I would remind the Committee of just one or two simple and salient facts.

I would recall what must be known to the Committee -- that the Soviet Union has of course already many nuclear missiles trained on countries in the Mediterranean zone. Not one of those missiles would be affected by such a declaration as this.

I would remind the Committee that if this declaration were taken up and accepted it would once more be a wholly one-sided one. Surely my colleagues remember that Mr. Khrushchev has reminded us of this fact. Perhaps I should quote something which he said on 11 August 1961:

"But it is well-known that military bases are not located in deserts. Reportedly in Italy they are located in citrus groves; and in Greece, in olive groves.

"Perhaps there are some who expect certain cities to be proclaimed open cities as was possible during the last world war. But one should not allow oneself to indulge in illusions. In a future thermonuclear war, if it is touched off, there will be no difference between front and rear."

"I have told the Greek Ambassador: 'The sanest policy for Greece is to withdraw from NATO. Then in case war does break out, Greece would not suffer'.

"The Ambassador told me: 'I trust that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union would never give the order to drop atomic bombs on the Acropolis and other historic monuments of Greece'.

"Mr. Ambassador, I should not like to be unpleasant, but you are deeply mistaken. Of course, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, I shall not issue orders that bombs be dropped specifically on the Acropolis. But our hand will not falter in striking a blow at the military bases of the North Atlantic bloc located in Greece also."

(Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p.278, United States Arms Control Disarmament Agency)

I give that quotation in order to show that as long as two years ago these missiles were, according to Mr. Khrushchev's own statement, directed at Mediterranean countries and would be affected in no way by such a declaration as this.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Why are we once again given these one-sided pictures of the position? Why say so much about the desire of the Soviet Union for peace, and yet at the same time offer things which are so clearly loaded in favour of the Soviet Union? Why must we get these charges against NATO repeated time and time again? I myself have recapitulated to this Committee the history of NATO, its foundation, the reasons for its foundation. It is well known that in fact NATO was formed so that the Western European countries could protect themselves against what they feared -- Soviet aggression.

One has to remind oneself of these facts in relation to the claims which have been made, but there is another point. Once again a proposal is put forward by the Soviet Union with no effective means of guaranteeing compliance with it. The proposal, in the words of the Soviet note submitted to my Government, was:

"In the interests of ensuring international security, the Soviet Government proposes that the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea should be declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons. It is prepared to assume an obligation not to deploy any nuclear weapons or their means of delivery in the waters of this area provided that similar obligations are assumed by the other Powers.

"If this area is declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons, then, jointly with the United States and the other countries of the West, the Soviet Union is prepared to give reliable guarantees that in the event of any military complications the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered as outside the sphere of use of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/91, pp. 8, 9)

What reliable guarantees does the Soviet Union propose? What reliable guarantees could it or anyone else propose in relation to nuclear submarines? We all know that one of the main features of nuclear submarines is that they can travel for thousands of miles below the surface of the water and are extremely difficult to detect. How does our Soviet colleague suggest that such a proposal could be verified? We know that the Soviet Union has nuclear submarines. We know that. How do we know that this statement would in fact be carried out? What possible way is there to police it? This is just one more of those glib suggestions which come so readily to the lips of our Soviet colleague, but of which there is no effective means of verification at all. I do suggest that proposals such as this, which are ill-conceived, ill-thought out and which seem to be directed purely for propaganda purposes, really do not help us forward with our work, particularly when we are told that this particular type of weapon is the one primarily chosen for aggression.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I have pointed out in the past that the degree of invulnerability of a nuclear weapon is in many respects a safeguard against the risks of starting a nuclear war. Obviously, anyone seeking to start a nuclear war could do so either with static missiles or with missiles mounted on nuclear submarines, which are relatively invulnerable. But the point is that those who possess the invulnerable weapon would not have to start the war if one were to be started. They are in the position of being able to wait. And it may be that the displeasure which the Soviet Union evinces in this note is because it is not so well able now to threaten, in the terms which Mr. Khrushchev used in the quotation I gave, those smaller Mediterranean countries; because if their defence is being provided by nuclear submarines which are very difficult to detect, then the point of threatening anyone who has the possession of bases no longer exists. It may be that that is one of the reasons.

I have expressed this immediate reaction merely to show that the statement is not helpful and that it seems to be yet one more propaganda-loaded statement. If we can get on to discussing and finding ways of eliminating all these various weapons in the course of general and complete disarmament that will be effective, but to try to go ahead with proposals of this kind which, as I have said, appear to me, and I believe should appear to most objectively minded people, to be designed solely for propaganda purposes, will not help our Conference at all.

I should not have indulged in addressing the Committee on this subject at all this morning but for the speech we have heard from our Soviet colleague, and I think it important that we should at once show up this proposal for what it is, and so get back to serious discussion of matters on which we can resolve our differences and can make progress. That is what I want to do, whether it be on a nuclear test ban or on any other issue; and I repeat that, so far as concerns nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world, where these complications do not exist, our attitude remains precisely as I have stated it previously.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): It was our hope this morning that the Soviet representative would not have felt called upon to raise such a blatant propaganda issue as his Government's recent proposal to create an atom-free zone of the Mediterranean sea, (ENDC/91) but since he has evidently felt under instructions to raise the question my delegation also is compelled to make some brief remarks.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

This Soviet proposal fits the pattern of numerous past Soviet proposals hastily thrown together on the eve of NATO Ministerial meetings. However, it is perhaps an even more blatantly propagandistic effort than those to which we have been treated by the Soviet Union in the past, since it involves clearly and patently one-sided measures of disarmament and redeployment of forces. It is, of course, directed at the more stable seaborne deterrent forces which the United States has deployed in the Mediterranean area in defence of all members of the North Atlantic alliance. Those forces are replacing certain other land-based missile systems now being deactivated. The Soviet proposal seems clearly limited to seaborne forces and the ports at which those forces might call. Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its allies would perform a single act of arms reduction or withdrawal under this Soviet proposal.

As our United Kingdom colleague has pointed out (supra, p. 23), not one of the many Soviet land-based missiles aimed at Western Europe would be in any way affected by this proposal. A more completely one-sided measure would be difficult to imagine. Certainly it could not have been put forward with any serious expectation that it could constitute a serious disarmament proposal. Such a proposal, as our United Kingdom colleague has also pointed out (supra, p. 24), breaches the essential principle of balance carefully enunciated in the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5); and that alone is enough to mark the Soviet note which we have heard this morning on an atom-free Mediterranean (ENDC/91) as a shallow effort at propaganda with no intention of stimulating serious negotiations.

I should like, in reply to the statement of the Soviet representative on this subject this morning, to read into the record a statement issued by the spokesman of the Department of State on 22 May 1963:

"The Soviet note on nuclear defence forces of NATO in the Mediterranean delivered to the Department of State last night is being studied but appears to be typical of the moves that the Soviet Union is in the habit of making on the eve of NATO meetings. What the Soviets are proposing is that we eliminate our seaborne nuclear capacity in the Mediterranean which is one of NATO's most effective counters to repeated Soviet threats to use their own nuclear weapons against members of the NATO alliance.

"Neither the Soviet Union nor any other country has anything to fear from any defensive measures of NATO countries. The Soviet Union could contribute more to the cause of peace by a positive attitude in disarmament talks than by propaganda notes; and threats against its peaceful neighbours - most recently, for example, in Marshal Malinovsky's speech of 22 February 1963."

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): The representative of Italy, who wishes to exercise his right of reply on a point of order, has the floor.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): On the Committee's agenda for today, as agreed between the two co-Chairmen and accepted by all delegations, was the continuation of the debate on the cessation of nuclear tests. Now, we have heard statements from the Soviet and the Bulgarian delegation - one of them taking up more than an hour of the Committee's time - which dealt with a quite different question and mainly served as a pretext for a renewed barrage against the Western Powers that has absolutely nothing to do with the framing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and even less with the question on our agenda: the prohibition of nuclear tests.

On this subject I should like to put two questions. The first is strictly procedural: Was there an agreement between the co-Chairmen to change today's agenda and to discuss this morning subjects other than nuclear tests?

Secondly, how am I to interpret the fact that the delegations of the socialist countries have refused this morning to speak about nuclear tests and apparently wish to abandon the debate on that question? Does it mean that the socialist delegations, or at least some of them, intend to give up the negotiations on nuclear tests as if any agreement were now impossible? That is certainly not how we feel. On the contrary, we hope and trust that the Western nuclear Powers' recent efforts may bring a ray of hope into our negotiations, which have so far been deadlocked.

We do not know the Soviet Government's reply to the approach of the Western nuclear powers. But is the almost complete silence maintained by the Soviet delegation today on the question of tests to be read as a negative indication? Has the fact that this morning the Socialist delegations have tried to change the subject any negative meaning? Must this silence be interpreted as a further display of rigidity, intransigence and negative intent? I myself sincerely hope this is not so. The Western delegations are too well aware of what is at stake in the prohibition of tests, too sensitive to the arguments only recently advanced by the representative of Sweden, not to regard with extreme disquiet the trends which have emerged this morning apparently designed to divert the Committee from its main and most important objective, the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): As four delegations have already stated their position on a question which by its nature, Mr. Cavalletti, is closely related to the issue of eliminating the nuclear danger, and as, generally speaking, every delegation has the right to speak at any time upon such questions as it deems fit, I think I may be allowed to address myself to the same measures upon which four representatives have already spoken.

I listened with especial interest to the statement made today (supra, pp.9 et seq.) by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, concerning the Soviet Government's proposal (ENDC/91) aimed at declaring the Mediterranean area a denuclearized zone. The Romanian delegation proposes to speak on that issue in detail later. At present I want to stress the fact that in fostering the creation of a denuclearized zone in a region of great importance for the maintenance of international peace and security the Soviet Government's initiative is of such a nature as to promote to a significant extent the cause of international peace and security, the cause of disarmament.

The Romanian Government is guided consistently in its foreign policy by the conviction that it is its duty, as it is equally the duty of all governments with a sense of the responsibility they bear for the fate of their own peoples, to militate for the settlement by peaceful means of the great international issues and to act for the implementation of general and complete disarmament and the liberation of mankind from the nightmare of the nuclear danger. The Government of the Romanian People's Republic is making its contribution to the settlement of the major international issues of the present day, working for the establishment of a climate favourable to their solution both in the geographical area to which it belongs and throughout the world. Already in 1957 the Romanian People's Republic proposed that an understanding be reached in the Balkans. It would be in the interests of all the peoples of that geographical region to turn the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from nuclear weapons and rockets, and it would represent a concrete contribution towards the relaxation of international tension.

The fundamental requirements of international life today, more than at any previous time, demand that the relations between States be guided by principles of peace and friendship among the peoples, by principles of peaceful co-existence. The new Soviet initiative which has been put before us today fully answers those requirements of the contemporary world.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

At this juncture I should like to emphasize my complete disagreement with the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, who called the important Soviet note a propaganda document. What we have before us is really a concrete measure meant to help us to achieve the elimination of the nuclear threat.

The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic welcomes the proposal made by the Government of the Soviet Union with regard to the Mediterranean region's being declared a nuclear-free zone, and will give it its full support.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to reply to the perplexities which have arisen in the mind of the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti.

He raised what appeared to be a question of procedure. He failed to understand why the Soviet delegation today suddenly took up the question of declaring the Mediterranean Sea a nuclear-free zone. He asked whether there had been any agreement between the co-Chairmen to change the agenda for today's meeting. In putting this question Mr. Cavalletti wanted to say, as it were, that my statement was not in order. In addition to what the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, has said, I should like to refer to certain specific examples of our work. We all know that Mondays are assigned to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, but on Monday 6 May the representatives of Brazil (ENDC/PV.128, p.10) and Mexico (ibid. p.14) placed before the Committee the initiative of the Presidents of five Latin American countries regarding the creation of a denuclearized zone in Latin America. (ENDC/87) Literally all, or nearly all, the members of our Committee spoke on this question and no one had even a shadow of doubt as to whether this was in accordance with the accepted rules of procedure; no one addressed the slightest reproach to the representatives of Brazil and Mexico. That is quite natural, because everyone realizes that that question is an important and serious one and deserves our attention. Moreover, Mr. Cavalletti; you yourself spoke on the same Monday on the question raised by the representatives of Brazil and Mexico and at that time you did not raise the question whether there had been a decision of the co-Chairmen to change the agenda, that is, to switch over to the question of the declaration of the Presidents of five Latin American countries.

Let us take another example. Last Wednesday 22 May a statement was made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal. (ENDC/PV.135, p. 29 ) We all know that Wednesdays are devoted to questions of disarmament, but she spoke on the question of the cessation of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

nuclear weapon tests, and no one rebuked her. Here again, we consider that was quite right. I think that after these explanations, in addition to what the representative of Romania has said, (supra, p.25) all the doubts of the Italian representative should be dispelled.

Now I should like to deal with what has been said by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, (supra, p.22) and the United States representative, Mr. Stelle (supra, p. 26). In listening to them, I heard several unflattering epithets which they bestowed upon our statement, our note (ENDC/91). Mr. Godber said it was pure propaganda and Mr. Stelle even said it was blatant propaganda. Mr. Godber called our statement an extravagant one which leads the Committee aside. He said it was a pointless manoeuvre. Mr. Stelle said it was propaganda hastily thrown together on the eve of the NATO Council meetings. Then Mr. Godber said that this proposal was not practicable in relation to Europe (supra, p. 23). I must say that all these harsh, I would even say, rude words with regard to the Soviet proposal are not a convincing argument and do not justify the position of the representatives of the Western Powers. This position is a strange one. Mr. Godber says the proposal is not practicable, but the peoples of the world think that it is. You say that the Soviet proposal to declare the Mediterranean Sea a nuclear-free zone is not practicable, but it is well known that you said the same thing about Africa, whereas the peoples of Africa have said that it is practicable, that Africa should be free from nuclear missile weapons and that in Africa there should not be a single nuclear bomb whether American or from any other country. The representatives of the Western Powers should stop advancing their claims and ascribing their views and moral principles to the peoples of Africa, the Mediterranean and Latin America and should stop depicting themselves as the prophets or leaders of these peoples.

You are pursuing an imperialist policy, a policy of militarism, and that is why you do not want to disarm. But actually you behave in the following way - whenever the Soviet Union puts forward a disarmament proposal, whether for the elimination of nuclear weapons or for the elimination of their means of delivery, for the reduction of armed forces and armaments or for the renunciation of the use of foreign territory for the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. (ENDC/75), and so on and so forth, our Western partners reject these proposals and continue the armaments race. Then, referring to the situation which has come about as the result of the position of the Western Powers, Mr. Godber tells us that it is not practicable to accept the Soviet proposal while an armaments race is going on (supra, p.23). In other words, the Western

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Powers themselves create the conditions for an armaments race and feverish military preparations and then, referring to this situation of their own making, they say that in these conditions they cannot accept the Soviet proposals. They themselves create a vicious circle and point to it as an argument against the Soviet disarmament proposals. An amazing logic! Amazing manoeuvres! Mr. Godber told us that the Soviet Union had said that its hand would not falter in striking a blow at the military bases of the North Atlantic bloc located in Greece. He used this as an argument to show that the Soviet proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean Sea was allegedly not serious. But, Mr. Godber, we are proposing something quite different; we are proposing that there should be no such bases in Greece, Italy or other countries of the Mediterranean. We are proposing to clear the Mediterranean Sea of the nuclear submarines roving about it, which carry with them the possibility of provoking a nuclear missile war at any moment. There is no doubt that if the Western Powers assume such an obligation, the Soviet Union will assume the same obligation and declare its readiness to respect it and give reliable guarantees that the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered as being outside the sphere of use of nuclear weapons in the event of any military complications, and no nuclear strikes will threaten Greece, Turkey or Italy or any other Mediterranean country.

Undoubtedly, such guarantees are aimed at precluding the possibility of a nuclear missile war in this area, and this can be achieved only if you withdraw your nuclear submarines equipped with nuclear missile weapons and renounce the use of the territories and waters of the Mediterranean States for basing your nuclear weapons and your submarines with nuclear missiles there. That is the point. Whenever the Soviet Union puts forward a proposal of that kind, your first move, your first reaction is to reject it. That is so even now. Is it the right behaviour on the part of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, to whose Governments the notes have been sent, to reject this Soviet proposal even before they have studied it, even before the official reply of their Governments? Is this right? Does this open up before us real possibilities of agreement? No. You have a predetermined policy - the policy "from a position of strength", which has been confirmed in the recent decision of the NATO Council in Ottawa, a predetermined policy which required you, a few days after nuclear explosions had been cancelled by the President of the United States, to start again carrying out underground nuclear explosions, and so on. That is your policy; that is what determines

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the present situation in international relations; that is why disarmament questions are at a standstill here in the Committee, and outside the Committee the armaments race is being more and more intensified.

But I should not like anyone to descry in this description of the present international situation an admission of a hopeless deadlock, a pessimistic or fatalistic feeling that matters have already reached the point where there is no way out of the existing situation. Not at all. Those who reject disarmament measures would, of course, like to bring about in the minds of the peoples a mood of fatalism, resignation and profound pessimism. But in actual fact, human society is a living organism full of internal forces and capable of overcoming even those incredibly difficult situations which are being created by the leading powers of NATO. We see these favourable trends in the decision to turn Africa into a denuclearized zone. (A/RES/1652(XVI)) These positive factors, which give us ground to hope for a settlement of disarmament questions can also be seen in the initiative shown by the five Latin American Presidents. (ENDC/87) We can see a positive trend also in such facts as the refusal of some NATO countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland) (DC/201/Add.2) to allow the leading States in that Organization to station nuclear weapons in those countries. These facts are very significant. They show that there are forces in the world that are able to oppose and force into retreat those who rely and set their hopes only on a policy "from a position of strength", only on the armaments race and preparation for another war.

I do not think that what has been said off-hand today by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy represents statements made in accordance with instructions from their Governments. This applies particularly to Italy. The proposal put forward by the Soviet Union is of vital importance to that country and I do not think that the Government of Italy will treat the assessment of this Soviet proposal as lightly as the Italian representative has done. Italy is a country on whose territory are the greatest cultural treasures, the heritage of a thousand years of culture. Almost every city in Italy is not only a pleasure for the eyes of the tourist but is also an illustrious reminder of previous epochs. These cities belong to all mankind as evidence of remarkable periods of flowering of the culture of mankind. They must be preserved, and I do not think that the Italian people, the Greek people and the other peoples inhabiting the Mediterranean countries will take a negative attitude towards this proposal of the Soviet Union, as the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have done. We are convinced that the peoples are in favour of this proposal and

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

that those Governments which heed the voice of the peoples will give a different assessment to this proposal and not that which we have heard today from the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy. The latter, it is true, laid stress on the procedural aspect of the matter, but behind this procedural aspect could be seen his obviously negative attitude towards the proposal of the Soviet Union to declare the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea a zone free from nuclear weapons.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I had no intention of speaking at today's meeting, but in connexion with the questions being discussed today I should like to express the view of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to one of them. In view of the lateness of the hour, I shall be very brief. I should like to say that the Czechoslovak delegation has listened with great interest and comprehension to the important statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, a statement which included the text of the Note of the Government of the Soviet Union dealing with the deployment of United States submarines in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, and its proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a zone free from nuclear missile weapons. (ENDC/91) Having heard the full text of the Note and Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, as well as the remarks of our other colleagues on this question, the Czechoslovak delegation reserves the right to deal with it in greater detail at one of the subsequent meetings of our Committee. Today, however, I should merely like to say that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic wholeheartedly and resolutely supports the Soviet Union's initiative in regard to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the area of the Mediterranean Sea as a most important contribution to the cause of consolidating peace, which at the same time facilitates the main task of our Committee, namely, the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion, in view of the importance of the Soviet Union's proposal, I am not surprised at the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States and their repetition of their usual arguments to the effect that it is propaganda, a one-sided measure, and so on and so forth.

I realize that the Soviet Union's proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a nuclear-free zone is not to the liking of the representatives of the Western Powers. But our Committee cannot and must not close its eyes to the fact that the area of the Mediterranean Sea is now becoming a new sphere of the nuclear armaments race which is the most serious obstacle in our work on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

As regards the statement (*supra*, p. 27) made by the Italian representative, I consider it necessary to recall that under our rules (ENDC/PV.108, p.34 *et seq.*) every delegation is entitled to speak on any matter in the course of our discussions, as has already been emphasized by the representatives of Romania and the Soviet Union and as the practical conduct of our negotiations shows.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (*translation from French*): I much appreciate Mr. Tsarapkin's concern for Italy's artistic heritage, which, as he so rightly said, does not exist only for the pleasure of tourists. However, I should like to assure him that the Italians have long ago grown up and are quite capable of safeguarding their artistic heritage without awaiting the - undoubtedly friendly - advice which the Soviet Government or delegation might care to give them.

As Mr. Tsarapkin freely admitted, my statement was purely procedural, and it was on a point of procedure that I asked for the floor. I want to stress that because, as the Committee knows, my Government has not yet been formed and has not been able to go into the Soviet Government's note.

I took a stand on procedure because I think that it is very important and that we should without further delay put some order into our debates. We have established a rule allotting a particular question to the three meetings we hold per week. We should abide by that rule to ensure fruitful discussion and to enable delegations to prepare their statements and make constructive contributions to discussion.

The examples Mr. Tsarapkin has given the Committee are not at all convincing. On 8 May there was an informal agreement between the two co-Chairmen that the delegations of Mexico and Brazil should inform the Committee of their proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America, and all delegations, including my own, were prepared to take part in the debate.

The Swedish delegation exercised a right which we acknowledged when our agenda was drawn up, namely, that any delegation may at any time raise again the question of nuclear tests, precisely because we regarded it as the most important question of all.

I would therefore urge that our discussions should not wander from the point and become propaganda debates but follow the agenda we have drawn up. I should like to point out that it is unbecoming for one of the co-Chairmen to set a bad example by departing from the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should like to take a moment to clarify one small point in connexion with the reply which the representative of the Soviet Union was courteous enough to make to me.

Mr. Tsarapkin said that the note (ENDC/91) submitted by the Soviet Union to my Government, among others, had been a diplomatic approach; therefore he seemed to think that it was wrong that I should immediately respond here. May I make the position clear? In so far as a diplomatic note was submitted to my Government his Government will no doubt receive in due course a diplomatic reply; but when our Soviet colleague introduces that note into this Conference, and then embellishes it before us, he must really not seek to restrain me from making some initial response to proposals he has put forward. Otherwise, it would be very odd and one-sided. Therefore, had he not introduced the note this morning, and had he left it for a diplomatic reply, he would have had exactly that; but as he has introduced it here, I have felt it only right to give my first reaction before my colleagues in the Committee lest they should possibly misunderstand the position of the United Kingdom in this connexion. Certainly no disrespect was meant to Mr. Tsarapkin's Government; I merely wished to clarify the position for the benefit of others sitting here.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): On the list of speakers for today there is only one name left: Brazil. With your permission I shall avail myself of the few minutes remaining to comment on our agenda item, the question of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

I have nothing much to say, and nothing new, I think; for in our view the problem has been fully discussed and thoroughly analyzed in this Committee. But I feel all the same that there is no harm in repeating, from a somewhat different angle and with due regard to the course of events, certain things that have already been said.

So I must explain and stress Brazil's position. You all know, I think, that Brazil has always, whether in this Committee or in the United Nations General Assembly, done its utmost to make a positive contribution to the conclusion of a treaty on the banning of nuclear tests.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

The basic reason why Brazil is striving so hard to that end is my delegation's absolute conviction that this is a fundamental problem that must be solved if one day we are to have a disarmed world instead of a world divided by antagonism and armed hostility constituting a threat to all mankind. We believe - and I think it is hard not to believe - in the simple idea that we shall never succeed in disarming the world until we ourselves have taken the first step towards what a Brazilian representative called the "nuclear cease-fire". In other words, an end must be put at least to these nuclear tests, as a proof of understanding, goodwill and the desire to achieve a solution to our world's problems that will not be a solution by force but, this time, a solution by the force of justice.

In that spirit I must add that Brazil believes there is ground for hope. It is true that in certain respects we are disheartened; but, on the other hand, there are circumstances and events in the world which sometimes give us a glimpse of a "ray of hope", as one of today's earlier speakers put it. (supra, p.27)

The ray of hope we have is that the great Powers, which understand better than the rest of the world the full gravity of the atomic danger, are the first to fall into line with world public opinion and say that an end must be put to nuclear tests. The representatives of the nuclear Powers have always agreed in stating categorically that the greatest threat to mankind today is an atomic war. They are also agreed that the threat keeps increasing with the improvement, diversification and dissemination of nuclear weapons. The production of new types of nuclear weapon is closely linked with the carrying out of the nuclear tests which we condemn, which we always have condemned, whatever their origin or the reasons given to justify them, and which were also condemned by the United Nations at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

(A/RES/1762(XVII) - ENDC/63).

All this points to the irrefutable fact that the greatest threat to the world today is undoubtedly the nuclear threat.

Now, when we discuss here the conclusion of a treaty on the banning of nuclear tests in order to remove that serious threat, the nuclear Powers advance various arguments connected with their national security which impede the signature of such a treaty and clearly show the possible risks in any treaty that was defective either through lack of adequate and reliable controls or through the abuse of controls.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

As representative of a non-aligned country which is not a member of the "atomic club", on my own behalf and, I dare believe, on behalf perhaps of all peace-loving peoples and nations that do not look to war as a solution to any problem whatever, I should like to say, very respectfully but at the same time quite frankly, that such arguments do not strike me as sufficiently convincing - for a very simple reason. If the greatest danger lies in nuclear war and the perfecting of nuclear weapons, all other possible dangers, including those mentioned by the nuclear Powers when they express their fear of a defective treaty on the banning of nuclear tests, are less serious dangers which must necessarily be subordinated to that of nuclear war. The nuclear Powers, which believe in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, which believe in the defence of peace through the balance of terror, claim that that balance must on no account be upset.

For the sake of maintaining that balance proposals have often been opposed that might have promoted the process of general and complete disarmament. But the continuance of nuclear tests, far from helping to preserve the balance, is clearly and openly designed, through the technical progress it achieves, to make it possible to upset the balance in the potential interest of one or other of the opposing camps. So the safeguard for the maintenance of the balance lies in the complete cessation of nuclear tests and not in the stubborn attempt to continue them.

For all those reasons, we cannot conceal our disappointment that at this Conference we are not making progress at the rate required to prevent the continuance of these nuclear tests, which are daily becoming more threatening and more dangerous for mankind.

With that point in mind the Brazilian delegation again urges that these tests, which are tests of preparation for death, be stopped and that we go on to experiments and tests which will rid us of this threat and thus serve the interests of human life. The chief and most urgent experiment, the experiment most essential to the interests of mankind would be the experiment of banning nuclear tests. Obviously, it would only be an experiment. Let's admit it. As in any experiment, we cannot exactly foresee its positive results. But what we can say beyond shadow of doubt is that negative results can never be more negative than those of the other kind of experiment, nuclear tests, of which we do not know where they may lead us.

That is our position. That is our aspiration. That, it would appear, is the only truly positive contribution we can make to this Conference. I venture to hope that the great Powers will appreciate that if we, who belong to the group of non-aligned countries, are not taking as active a part in this Conference as we should like, the fault lies not

(The Chairman, Brazil)

with us but with the obstacles arising out of the circumstances I have referred to, which have resulted in all our projects and approaches being thwarted.

We make this statement because we are well aware that the eyes of the whole world are on this Conference and that a well-defined public opinion is taking shape regarding the way in which we are carrying out the mandate given us by the United Nations - in other words, the world - when resolution A/PES/1722(XVI) was adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. This, I think, is what induces us once more to voice the appeal of world public opinion, which wishes this Conference to produce more effective and more positive results. Public opinion is coming more and more alive. We have before us a number of appeals from institutions and eminent persons, all referring with some emotion to the subject and telling us that a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests is awaited with impatience, concern and anxiety. With your permission, I shall read out one of these documents which I consider fully reflects world feeling because it is signed by men regarded as leaders of world thought. I refer to the document signed at the meeting convened in Rome by the Director-General of FAO - the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization - entitled "Manifesto ... on Man's Right to freedom from Hunger".

Although there appears to be no very close link between this subject and the problems of disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests, the document shows that men came together to combat hunger, a terrible scourge of which mankind must rid itself, and believing there was an even greater scourge turned to our problem, the scourge of fear, terror of war and war itself, with all its consequences, including even the extermination of mankind. I urge that you allow me to read out this document\*/ in the original English text.

(continued in English)

"More than half the human race is either undernourished or malnourished; yet about 150 billion dollars were spent on armaments in 1962, while the sum spent on development was an insignificant proportion of it. When we consider that in the twentieth century, one child out of three is born without any chance of living a normal life, we are forced to conclude that our civilization is mutilating its human resources and reducing its chances of progress. The situation is getting worse because the population is increasing rapidly and food production is not keeping pace with it. The means are, nevertheless, at hand to meet this challenge and if they are used properly, the hope of a world free from the miseries of hunger can now be realized. Is mankind alive to this danger and prepared to meet it?

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\*/ Circulated as document ENDC/92

(The Chairman, Brazil)

"It is intolerable that the vast reservoir of knowledge and wealth which exists in the world is hardly being used for improving the lot of the many who are desperately in need of it. Of the several wants of man, food is primary. Hunger and malnutrition can impede the progress of a nation in every other sphere.

"No development can be lasting which is not based on a mobilization of national resources. But external aid is indispensable initially to guide and supplement these efforts. The impediments to improvement are social and economic rather than scientific and the supply of know-how and capital and the provision of facilities for education are the best means of ensuring an evolution towards a better life. The problems are complex, vast and urgent and can be solved only if national efforts are supported by international assistance and co-operation. In this connexion, trade agreements should aim to preserve the dignity and independence of developing countries by enabling them to sell their products in the markets of the world. Co-operation by all economically advanced nations, both capitalist and communist, in the conquest of hunger and poverty, the common enemy of all mankind, may indeed breed sufficient mutual trust and confidence to assist progress towards that other of the fundamental freedoms, namely, freedom from the fear of war.

"The Freedom from Hunger Campaign seeks to stimulate national and international effort. It aims to inform the Governments and educate the people so as to make the best use of the total resources of all nations.

"We desire to state with all the emphasis at our command that freedom from hunger is man's first fundamental right. In order to achieve this, we suggest urgent and adequate national and international effort in which the Governments and the peoples are associated. More particularly, we desire to draw attention to the colossal waste of resources in the piling up of more and new forms of armaments and the immense assistance to the Campaign against Hunger that even a partial diversion of these funds could achieve. We feel that international action for abolishing hunger will reduce tension and improve human relationships by bringing out the best instead of the worst in man."

This document was signed in Rome by dozens of people, including over a dozen Nobel-prize holders. We posses other documents and, although I don't intend reading them all out to you, I would nevertheless draw your attention to some of them.

(continued in French)

There is, for instance, a second document of the highest importance, namely, the motion tabled in the House of Commons by 63 Labour Members of Parliament seeking to close the gap between the United States and Soviet viewpoints on the cessation of nuclear tests.

There is a third document that demands our full attention. This is the manifesto issued by the French intellectuals in connexion with the Etats Généraux du Désarmement. The French writers who signed this text state that disarmament is today becoming much more than one of several means of achieving peace; the existence of weapons of total destruction makes disarmament the sine qua non for the survival of mankind.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

This document also demands our attention because it is signed by intellectuals of great renown and world fame, many of whom have won the Prix Goncourt or other prizes awarded by France to its greatest intellectuals.

There is yet another document, signed by United States scientists and artists. We have seen a telegram to the effect that 103 United States scientists and artists, including 11 Nobel Prize winners, have approached President Kennedy with the request that he explain the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests to the American people. This shows their lively interest in our problem.

Finally, there is a document signed not by intellectuals but by statesmen already referred to here today. I mean the Addis Ababa Declaration on general disarmament in which the Heads of State of the African countries declare Africa a denuclearized zone and announce their intention of using every effort to abolish nuclear tests there and to work for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons there. (ENDC/93/Rev.1) This is a document which merits our full attention; it has the full support of the Brazilian delegation, since ours is one of the five countries to sign a treaty or joint declaration aimed at doing the same for Latin America as the Heads of State of the African countries have done for their continent. (ENDC/87)

So we have a whole series of facts; and actually today's newspapers give another significant one, although I do not know how much trust we can place in it. I refer to two press articles. In any case, as I said, I will be optimistic enough to believe what papers tell me: that President Kennedy, in consultation with the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, is now working on a new note, in reply to Mr. Khrushchev's, designed to keep negotiations going on the most positive lines possible. According to the newspapers, they are considering suggesting that the Soviet Union appoint scientists who might win over the Western Powers to the control safeguards demanded by the Soviet Union as a condition for its acceptance of the treaty. I would recall that last June the Brazilian delegation - taking the view that there should really be a technical basis - proposed the setting-up of a sub-committee of experts or technicians, a group of experts who would not take part in our political discussions but might guide us and enlighten us on the scientific implications of any treaty we might try to sign. (ENDC/PV.54)

(The Chairman, Brazil)

This initiative is welcome. We all know that it is easier to achieve understanding in the field of science than in that of politics. Let us always remember that, when Einstein was asked why man, having discovered atomic energy did not use it for good but rather for the destruction of mankind, he replied that he thought it was because politics is a much more complex science than physics. Well, understanding is easier to achieve in the sphere of science, and I believe that if this particular proposal is put into effect it will be most welcome because it will clarify certain aspects of the problem.

I also think that the political aspects have been discussed at too great length. If we reach an understanding on details, on the implementation aspects of the treaty, I believe that we shall have overcome all the obstacles which have so far come between the desire - a universal desire - to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests and the actual facts of the situation in which these tests continue.

In conclusion - and I apologize for speaking too long - I would make one final appeal to the nuclear Powers to remember their own interests and the need to give their attention to a problem that is really very simple. I think that all the Powers, great and small, have some subconscious problems that have to be pulled up into the conscious. These problems are as follows:

I believe that everyone - all the representatives here present and the representatives of all the countries in the world - understands perfectly well the Great Powers' desire to safeguard what they call the "national security" of each country. We agree that national security is very important; but I should like to point out that world security must not be sacrificed for the sake of national security by over-insistence on absolute safeguards.

From that angle, it may be possible to make concessions with regard to national security in order to defend international security, on which the national security of every country in the world, including the Great Powers, actually depends.

In my opinion, therefore, all that is needed is a slight shift in the focus of concern about this problem. Every Power refers to its security, and is accordingly looking at the questions of banning tests and disarmament, which are world problems, from too national an angle, so that we still have with us the old view of the origins of the world, from the time of the astronomer Ptolemy, that the earth is the centre of the universe. The discoveries of Copernicus showed that the world was merely a speck of dust of secondary importance, and was not the centre of anything. So the cosmogonic view of the universe was discarded.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

In the Brazilian delegation's opinion, this problem must be viewed after Copernicus rather than after Ptolemy. In other words, the problem must be regarded as universal, and the stake as the interest of all mankind. Then, perhaps, there might in the interest of international security be overtures, mutual concessions, compromises, to permit at length of the conclusion of the treaty which is the main objective of our Conference and what the whole world expects of us.

That is our position, and we shall do our utmost on those lines. Our purpose is, admittedly, limited. We are a non-aligned, non-nuclear country in process of development, but we all have a deep sense of international responsibility and we are doing all we can to help towards the realization of the objective.

My delegation is making this statement today because it is well aware that the eyes of the whole world are on this Conference and that there is a public opinion forming that - I repeat - is expecting a clear explanation from us of why we have so far not done our utmost to spare mankind the atomic holocaust which is inevitable if we do not succeed in banning nuclear tests, as the prelude to the whole disarmament process.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-seventh plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. de Castro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Brazil.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union submitted a document<sup>1/</sup> containing a Note dated 20 May 1963 from the Government of the USSR to the Government of the United States concerning the establishment of a rocket and nuclear weapons-free zone in the Mediterranean region.

"The delegation of Brazil submitted a document<sup>2/</sup> reproducing the Manifesto adopted in Rome on 14 March 1963 by the Special Assembly on Man's Right to Freedom from Hunger.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 29 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

1/ ENDC/91

2/ ENDC/92











